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INTRODUCTION

The effects of climate change on the world's cities and the people who
live in them are not subjects that have received a great deal of attention, at
least not in isolation from other climate change effects. Climate change effects tend to get considered in continental or regional terms: melting ice
caps, agricultural crop losses across vast swaths of land, and shoreline loss
that will inundate sub-continents.' Alternately, the discussion tends to focus on behavioral change, again at the level of entire national populations,
suggesting that countries must consider using cleaner energy sources, producing cleaner-burning vehicles, and providing incentives for citizens to
insulate their homes better. 2 Many, if not most, commentators seem to endorse the view that resolution of climate change challenges should be addressed at the global level and enforced by state parties pursuant to global
accords.3 More recently, there has been some discussion of the inequalities
that climate change will exacerbate. Crudely put, the analysis posits that
poorer nations, especially those in Asia and Africa, will become poorer,
1. See, e.g., David B. Lobell et al., PrioritizingClimate Change Adaptation Needs For
Food Security in 2030, 319 SCIENCE 607, 607-10 (2008) (noting agricultural crop losses in
Southern Africa and South Asia); Mark Stallworthy, Sustainability, Coastal Erosion and
Climate Change: An EnvironmentalJustice Analysis, 18 J. ENVTL. L. 357, 357-58 (2006)
(noting shoreline loss on the Indian subcontinent, the Nile Delta, and islands in the Indian
and Pacific Oceans); Deborah Zabarenko, Arctic Ice Cap Melting 30 Years Ahead of Forecast, REUTERS NEWS, May 1, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/idUSN01
22477020070501.
2. See, e.g., Daniel Roth, Driven: Shai Agassi's Audacious Plan to Put Electric Cars
on the Road, WIRED, Aug. 18, 2008, at 118, 124-25 (discussing the collaboration between
Project Better Place, Israel, and Renault-Nissan to build electric vehicles and use Israel as a
test-bed for deployment); Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Seeks Cleaner Energy New Solar
and Tidal Power Plants Will Be World's Largest, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 10, 2007, at 11
(noting South Korea's aim to increase its use of renewable energy to 10% from the current
2.28% by 2020); MASS. DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, GREENHOUSE GASES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT CAN You Do?, http://www.mass.gov/dep/air/climate/ (last visited
Oct. 18, 2008).
3. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and Virtues of Climate
Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 443 (2008); Elizabeth Burleson, Multilateral
Climate Change Mitigation,41 U.S.F. L. REv. 373 (2007); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1961 (2007);
Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas PermitsBe Allocated on a Per Capita Basis? 1 (U. Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 206, 2008), availableat http://ssm.com/
abstract=1 105205 (beginning with the observation that "[m]any people believe that the
problem of climate change would be best handled by an international agreement that includes a system of cap and trade."). See generally RICHARD STEWART & JONATHAN WIENER,
RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO (2003).
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while the richer nations will-if they do not become richer-suffer fewer
of the negative consequences of climate change. 4 In light of these differential climate change effects on poorer nations, some analysts have explored
the probability of increased civil strife. However, even when the literature
examines effects of climate change on civil strife, the analysis tends to address national roles and bilateral or multilateral national responses.5 Furthermore, when land use changes are discussed, urban land use is typically
excluded from consideration. The focus tends to be on deforestation and
agricultural land.6
This debate strikingly neglects what is arguably the dominant demographic shift of our era, namely the global trend towards urbanization-the
move to mega-cities. As the United Nations Population Fund reports, in
2008, a majority of the world's population will live in urban areas. That
number is expected to increase by another 50% by 2030. 7 In historical
4. See, e.g., Ruth Gordon, Climate Change and the Poorest Nations: FurtherReflections on Global Inequality, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 1559, 1589-91 (2007) (indicating that
global warming will have a disproportionate impact on low-income, unindustrialized nations); Amy Sinden, Climate Change and Human Rights, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL.
L. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
984266 (exploring application of human rights principles to guide climate change policy);
Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate
Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675, 168283 (2008) (noting that poorer nations are likely to be the biggest losers due to climate
change and the wealthier nations are less vulnerable and better able mitigate any negative
consequences); R. Ramachandran, Burden of the Poor, FRONTLINE, Mar. 9, 2007, at 31,
available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2404/stories/20070309003303100.htm (detailing an interview with Dr. Saleemul Huq on the disproportionate impact of climate
change on the poor and developing countries).
5. E.g., Elizabeth Burleson, Multilateral Climate Change Mitigation,41 U.S.F. L. REV.
1 (2007) (noting multilateral options to address climate change); Sanford E. Gaines, Sustainable Development and National Security, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
321, 364 (2006) (discussing implications of greenhouse emissions and climate change on
global security, particularly in causing floods, storms, and droughts in poor countries);
Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Ecology and Violence: The Environmental Dimensions of War, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 243 (2004) (analyzing the role of the environment and
competition over limited resources in war). A notable exception is U.N. POPULATION FUND,
STATE OF WORLD POPULATION 2007: UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF URBAN GROWTH 5859 (2007) [hereinafter STATE OF WORLD POPULATION]. Even then, however, the urban
analysis constitutes one and a half pages in a 108-page report. The full report is available at
http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2007/presskit/pdf/sowp2007_eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
6. E.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME &
WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., IPCC SPECIAL REPORT: LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE,
AND FORESTRY SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2000), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/special-reports/spm/srl-en.pdf.
7. STATE OF WORLD POPULATION, supra note 5, at 1 ("For the first time in history,
more than half its human population, 3.3 billion people, will be living in urban areas. By
2030, this is expected to swell to almost 5 billion."). STATE OF WORLD POPULATION does
not use a uniform definition for "urban areas" but explains that uses this term to refer to the
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terms, it is impossible to understate the significance of this phenomenon,
especially inasmuch as the vast majority of these urban immigrants will arrive with few resources and live in slum conditions.8 Moreover, perhaps
the characteristic feature of many such slums is that they are dominated by
the informal economy, characterized by oppressive systems of patronage,
corruption, and violence. 9 As the world gets hotter, this seems likely to
create a-perhaps literally--combustible situation.10 A host of factors, including environmental degradation, inadequate provision of environmental
and infrastructure services, and limited employment opportunities are combining to turn many of the world's mega-slums into dangerous, violent
places." Moreover, there is considerable literature that has examined the
relationship between increased urban violence and temperature rise. 12 It

definitions adopted by state statistical agencies, see STATE OF THE WORLD POPULATION, sUpra note 5, at 6; see also Daniel Howden, Planet of the Slums: UN Warns Urban Populations Set to Double, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), June 27, 2007 (writing about U.N. report finding
that many new urbanites will be poor and live in slums).
8. STATE OF WORLD POPULATION, supra note 5, at 1 ("[T]he next few decades will see
an unprecedented scale of urban growth in the developing world. This will be particularly
notable in Africa and Asia where the urban population will double between 2000 and 2030.
... By 2030, the towns and cities of the developing world will make up 80 per cent of urban humanity."); see, e.g., CARLOS WALTER PORTO-GONQALVES, A GLOBALIZACAO DA
NATUREZA E A NATUREZA DA GLOBALIZA(;AO [GLOBALIZATION OF NATURE AND THE NATURE

OF GLOBALIZATION] 185-91 (2006) (reporting that 76% of the world's population live in
slum conditions-53 million of them, according to the U.N., in the "First World"-and that
83% of the world's urban population live in "precarious" conditions).
9. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS 185 (2006).
10. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND:
FEELING THE HEAT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, http://unfccc.intlessential background/

feelingthe heat/items/2 91 7.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) ("The average temperature of
the earth's surface has risen by 0.74 degrees C since the late 1800s. It is expected to increase by another 1.8' C to 40 C by the year 21 00-a rapid and profound change-should
the necessary action not be taken. Even if the minimum predicted increase takes place, it
will be larger than any century-long trend in the last 10,000 years.").
11. A prominent researcher exploring the relationship between environmental scarcity,
environmental crises, and violence is the Canadian social scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon.
Although his work does not address climate change specifically, it does explore the relationship of environmental pressures and violence, including urban violence. See, e.g., THOMAS
F. HOMER-DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, SCARCITY, AND VIOLENCE 155-68 (1999) (studying urban
growth and violence); VALERIE PERCIVAL & THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, The Case of South Africa, in Eco-VIOLENCE: LINKS AMONG ENVIRONMENT, POPULATION, AND SECURITY 109,

122-36 (Thomas Homer-Dixon & Jessica Blitt eds., 1998) (studying the same for South African cities specifically).
12. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson et al., Hot Temperatures, Hostile Affect, Hostile Cognition, and Arousal: Tests of a General Model of Affective Aggression, 21 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 434, 434-48 (1995) (reporting results of two experiments examining
hot temperature effects on aggression while playing video games and engaging in aerobic
exercise; concluding that a direct relationship exists between hot temperatures and aggres-

sion); Craig A. Anderson et al., Hot Years and Serious Deadly Assault: Empirical Tests of
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does not seem unreasonable, therefore, to posit a connection between climate change and urban violence, one that calls for attention to the role of
cities in resolving the adverse effects of climate change. This Article does
not (because it cannot) presume to establish as an empirical matter that
climate change is a cause of urban violence. Rather, the connection between urban violence and climate change provides the point of departure
for this Article. That is, in light of the empirical work establishing a connection between urban violence and both environmental scarcity and temperature rise, this Article proceeds on the assumption that as an environmental pressure (perhaps the greatest environmental pressure), climate
change can only exacerbate these phenomena.
In light of this connection and its serious social and economic consequences, this Article seeks, therefore, to begin to define a role for cities and
their inhabitants in climate change governance. Part I argues that if we fail
to take into account global urbanization and its defining characteristics,
namely extreme squalor and associated social ills, as a central feature of
climate change policy, we face, as a Rio de Janeiro taxi driver said to me
during the hot, dry, violent winter of 2006 in that city, 13 "urn futuro bandido," literally "a bandit future." That is, we face a future where cities, the
places where most of the world's population lives, will experience sustained and perhaps intractable urban violence and social disintegration, a
development that can only hasten the separate but related harms caused by
the Heat Hypothesis, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1213 (1997) (reporting results of
two studies looking at the relation between annual average temperature and crime rate in the
years 1950-1995 and concluding that there is a direct link); Craig A. Anderson, Temperature and Aggression: The Ubiquitous Effects of Heat on Occurence of Human Violence,

106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74, 74 (1989) (reviewing relevant studies, violent crime, and domestic
crime while taking into account geographic regions, seasons, and monthly variations; concluding that there is a direct link between heat and aggression); James Rotton & Ellen G.
Cohn, Global Warming and US. Crime Rates: An Application of Routine Activity Theory,

35 ENv'T & BEHAV. 802 (2003) (finding that, for the period 1950-1999 in the United States,
"annual temperatures were associated with assault but not murder rates in analyses that controlled for yearly population, ethnicity, and three economic variables"). But see, e.g., Michelle L. Bell et al., Vulnerability to Heat-Related Mortality in Latin America: A CaseCrossover Study in Sjo Paulo,Brazil, Santiago, Chile and Mexico City, Mexico, 37 INT'L J.

EPIDEMIOLOGY 796 (2008), availableat http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/dyn094
(noting in passing the likelihood that climate change will exacerbate heat-related morbidity
and mortality); Vania Ceccato, Homicide in Sdo Paulo, Brazil: Assessing Spatial-temporal
and Weather Variations, 25 J. ENV'T PSYCHOL. 307 (2005) (finding stronger homicide-

temporal than homicide-climate correlation).
13. See

Henry

Chu,

Rio

Struggles to

Contain

Violence

on

the

Eve

of

the Tourism Season, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at A3 (noting that "[w]ith every summer
comes a spike in crimes against visitors" in Rio de Janeiro); Larry Rohter, 19 Are Killed as
Drug Gangs Conduct Attacks in Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2006, at A4 (reporting on the
wave of violence in Rio de Janeiro that coincided with the start of the summer tourist season).
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climate change on the world's human and biological populations. Part I
also explains that the term "cities" does not refer only-or even primarily-to elected or appointed municipal governments. Rather, Part I endorses an expansive understanding of cities to include both metropolitan
areas on the official grid and also the shantytowns and slums, the expansive
informal and extra-legal settlements that define urban living for millions
the world over.
Part II explores some of the consequences of the inattention of the climate change literature, and especially the mainstream U.S.-based legal
scholarship on climate change, to incorporate a voice for the world's megacities and their extensive mega-slums in climate change governance. In
particular, Part II argues that the failure to incorporate a voice for cities reinforces existing and seemingly intractable divisions in international efforts
to resolve climate change. Thus, elites with carbon-consumptive behaviors
in "developing" countries can hide behind their nations' demands for reductions in "developed" countries, while, conversely, responsible actors in
"developed" countries get grouped together with the carbon-consumptive
habits of their economic betters. Part II therefore suggests that the presence
of voices representing urban populations would help reveal some of the
self-interest on all sides and redirect climate change law and policy towards
the implementation of more equitable solutions.
Part III then outlines some of the normative advantages of city-inclusive
governance in the context of climate change regulation. Part III thus suggests how incorporating voices from cities in climate change governance
will serve the larger goals of climate change regulation, including emissions reductions strategies and particularly the goal of adaptive management.
Finally, Part IV outlines possible solutions to address the concerns addressed in the previous parts, suggesting ways in which climate change debate and the search for legal solutions to help combat the phenomenon
might take account of global urbanization. Specifically, Part IV suggests
ways in which a voice for cities, and in particular those urban residents
usually without voices-in local or national, much less international forums-may be heard, and their views taken into account in reversing the
negative effects of climate change.
I.

CITIES, SHANTYTOWNS, AND EXTRA-LEGAL SETTLEMENTS

This Part seeks to establish the value of cities, or portions of them, as actors in the resolution of global climate change problems. First and most
evidently, cities merit such a role because of their established strengths as
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centers of innovation and wealth. 14 Cities are also, however, centers of
inequality: it is this feature of modem cities that may be as important to
addressing climate change as their more positive aspects, given that in reality poor urban areas are anticipated disproportionately to suffer the effects
of global warming and associated ills. 15 It may also be observed that city
residents are especially concerned with climate change, in light of the dizzying profusion of local initiatives to address climate change.' 6 Yet, oddly,
14. Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1102-06 (2008) (acknowledging that cities are a key element of
innovation and noting that urban areas generate the bulk of economic wealth in the United
States).
15. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6.
16. Kevin Doran & Alaine Ginnochio, United States Climate Policy: Using Market
Based Strategies to Achieve Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L.
& POL'Y J. 31, 52 (2008) (identifying "dizzying profusion" of local initiatives, assumed to
occur because of a lack of federal action); David M. Driesen, The Changing Climate for
United States Law, 1 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 1, 36-41 (2007). A good summary of
state-level programs is Pace Law Sch. Ctr. for Envtl. Legal Studies, The State Response to
Climate Change: 50 State Survey, in MICHAEL B. GERRARD, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND
U.S. LAW 371 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/abapubs/globalclimate/docs/
stateupdate_1207.pdf. For examples of local climate change initiatives see California
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 (West
2008) (combining regulatory and marketplace mechanisms in an attempt to reduce the
state's greenhouse gas emissions by 25% by 2020); City Council of Austin, Res. No.
20070215-023 (Tex. 2007), available at http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/acpp/downloads/acpp
_res021507.pdf (resolving that climate change is a serious threat and creating a five-part
plan, The Austin Climate Protection Plan, that seeks to reduce and reverse the negative impacts of global warming); GREATER LONDON AUTH., ACTION TODAY TO PROTECT TOMORROw: THE MAYOR'S CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN (2007), http://www.london.gov.uk/
mayor/environment/climate-change/docs/ccapfullreport.pdf (noting London's plan to cut
and maintain emissions at 60% below 1990 levels by 2025); S.F. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T & S.F.
PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN FOR SAN FRANCISCO: LOCAL ACTIONS TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2004),
http://www.sfenvironment.org/downloads/

library/climateactionplan.pdf (noting San Francisco's plan to reduce overall greenhouse gas
emissions to 20% below 1990 levels by 2012); MAYOR'S GREENPRINT DENVER ADVISORY
COUNCIL, CITY OF DENVER CLIMATE ACTION PLAN: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAYOR

HICKENLOOPER (2007), http://www.greenprintdenver.org/docs/DenverClimateActionPlan.
pdf (outlining ten recommendations that are projected to achieve Denver's 2012 goal of reducing per capita greenhouse gas emissions by 10% below 1990 levels); CITY OF ASPEN CANARY INITIATIVE, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 2007-2009 (2007), http://www.canaryinitiative.

com/pdf/CAP.pdf (outlining Aspen's goals for addressing global warming and how they can
be achieved; the Plan is also meant to act as a mechanism to monitor progress and as a guiding document for all policies developed within the City); CITY OF L.A., GREEN LA: AN
ACTION PLAN TO LEAD THE NATION IN FIGHTING GLOBAL

WARMING (2007),

http://

www.lacity.org/ead/EADWeb-AQD/GreenLACAP_2007.pdf (laying out Los Angeles's
plan to reduce CO 2 emissions 35% below 1990 levels by 2030); U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAY.
ORS, THE U.S. MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION AGREEMENT (2005), http://www.usmayors.
org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.pdf (describing a voluntary agreement
signed by over 880 U.S. mayors in which participating cities agree to take the following actions: meet or beat the Kyoto Protocol targets in their own communities; urge their state
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in the United States, the federal government appears to object to this phenomenon; attempts are underway to silence local efforts to respond to cli17
mate change, even in the face of federal inaction.
A.

The Neglect of Cities

The neglect of cities in international climate change debates and, in particular, in U.S. legal scholarship addressing climate change is not entirely
surprising. As Gerald Frug noted in a classic piece nearly three decades
ago, cities have largely been rendered powerless in U.S. legal discourse and
practice. Frug noted the paradox that our "highly urbanized country has
chosen to have powerless cities, and that this choice has largely been made
through legal doctrine."' 18 Frug further noted another paradoxical development: "[n]ot only are cities unable to exercise general governmental

governments, and the federal government, to enact policies and programs to meet or beat
Kyoto Protocol targets suggested for the U.S.; and urge the U.S. Congress to establish a national emission trading system); CITY OF N.Y., PLANYC: A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK
(2007), http://home2.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/fullreport.pdf (containing,
in part, New York City's plan to reduce global warming emissions by more than 30%); ToRONTO ENERGY EFFICIENCY OFFICE, CLIMATE CHANGE, CLEAN AIR AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ACTION PLAN:
MOVING FROM FRAMEWORK TO ACTION, PHASE 1 (2007),

http://www.toronto.ca/changeisintheair/pdf/clean air actionplan.pdf (containing Toronto's
reduction targets for greenhouse gases from the 1990 levels of 6% by 2012, 30% by 2020,
and 80% by 2050); see also Matthew Garrahan, Antonio Villaraigosa: Mayor Sets Agenda
for the Nation, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/906430ac-a3b51 ldd-942c-000077b07658.html?nclick check= (documenting the desire of Los Angeles
Mayor Villaraigosa to make L.A. "the greenest city in the nation"). Developing countries
are also beginning to articulate climate change responses, as is the case, for example, with
Mexico City. See PROGRAMA DE ACCION CLIMATICA DE LA CIUDAD DE MIxICO 2008-2012
(2008) (copy on file with author). In addition, although a national rather than local initiative, the INDIAN PRIME MINISTER'S COUNCIL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN
ON CLIMATE CHANGE: GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, http://pmindia.nic.in/PgO1-52.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2008) merits attention for its focus on urban effects of climate change and policies appropriate to address them.
17. See, e.g., Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Climate Change: House Energy Chairman Releases Draft Bill That Would Preempt State Climate Actions, DAILY ENV'T REP., Oct. 8,
2008, at A-11; Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Outlook for Capping US. Emissions in 2009 May
Hinge on Depth of Economic Upheaval, DAILY ENV'T REP., Oct. 2, 2008, at B-3; Arnold
Schwarzenegger & Jodi Rell, Op-Ed., Lead or Step Aside, EPA: States Can't Wait on
Global Warming, WASH. POST, May 21, 2007, at A13 (criticizing the EPA's refusal to allow
twelve states to enact tougher tailpipe emissions standards). Despite congressional efforts to
the contrary, however, federal regulators have begun to show signs of accepting local government efforts as a productive route of climate change action. See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs,
EPA Regions Using Existing Programs to Help Industry, Governments Cut Emissions,
DAILY ENV'T REP., Sept. 8, 2008, at A- 1.
18. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1059-60
(1980).

2009]

OUR BANDIT FUTURE?

power, but they also cannot exercise the economic power of private corpo19
rations."
In the context of global climate change debates, Frug's observation is instructive: in climate change, corporate interests are among those recognized
as having a stake in resolving the problem, while cities are not. The corporate interest is often included because it is modified by the adjective "multinational," as if the mere fact of doing cross-boundary business merits inclusion with governmental stakeholders. At the same time, corporate
interests are also included because they are "sectoral." That is, they represent manufacturers, industries, and features of modem life that have helped
create the problem. Yet, as was the case when Frug wrote about the legal
place of U.S. cities, in global climate change cities are not recognized as
meriting similar influence and a seat at the table. This is true despite their
being home to the majority of the world's population.
Frug's analysis of this private/public divide, and its privileging of private interests, helps illuminate the relative exclusion today-in a different
context and nearly thirty years later-of city voices in climate change debates. That is, the exclusion of cities from a central place at the table in
climate change discussions may be said to occur because of a fundamental
distrust of them. As Frug noted of U.S. cities:
there is a widespread belief that although cities are supposed to protect the
public interest, they cannot really be trusted to do so. This distrust engenders support for state and federal control of cities to prevent local abuse of
power, curb local selfishness, or correct the inefficiencies resulting from
"balkanized" local decisionmaking. City discretion of any kind evokes
images of corruption, patronage, and even foolishness. This sense of necessity and desirability has made local powerlessness part of our definition of modem society, so that decentralization of power appears to be a
nostalgic memory of an era gone forever or a dream of romantics who fail
20
to understand the world as it really is.
Many of these arguments, albeit in softer, less caustic form, are typical
of the objections to local involvement in global climate change debates,
where uniformity and efficiency become the watchwords to guard against a
"patchwork" of competing and inconsistent local initiatives. 21 But Frug's

19. Id. at 1065.

20. Id. at 1067.
21. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case
of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1499, 1521 (2008) (exploring the positive contribu-

tion of states in development of federal policy, despite the recognition that "[t]he emerging
patchwork of state measures seems perfectly designed to make industry nervous"); see also,
e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The CaseAgainst Reallocating EnvironmentalRegulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1796 (2008) (defending the

220

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVI

observations ask us to consider whether this characterization is merited. Indeed, cities might have something useful to bring to the table when solutions to climate change are debated.
The evisceration of municipal power can be seen elsewhere in the world,
if for different reasons. For example, Brazil's 1988 constitution theoretically gives equal power to the federal, state, and local governments. However, as lawyer and urban planner Edrsio Fernandes has noted, "in Brazil,
the decision-making process of urban questions was highly centralized by
the federal government, which treated them from a merely technobureaucratic perspective." 22 Fernandes explains that this led to a depoliticization of urban policy and the resulting domination of public patronage
and clientele patterns deeply rooted in Brazilian history.23 Limited local
control and limited participation in decisions affecting land use and environmental management can be noted as well in anglophone Africa:
[I]n many African countries local elected councillors [sic] have little or no
say in planning decisions which are controlled by central government.
Equally, there is no public participation in the making of plans, or of decisions on development control. The elitist nature of planning law in Nigeria is therefore paralleled throughout24anglophone Africa and has been extensively commented on by lawyers.
To be sure, the limitation of the power of cities, and particularly of
popular representation within cities, may derive from different root causes.
In the United States, Frug argued that cities were disempowered to promote
private commercial interests. 25 In less developed countries, in contrast, this
may be done as an imperative of development aid that refuses to wait for
the cumbersome process of local decision-making, 26 while land use decisions in other countries may have been consolidated at the national level in
order to secure power of ruling political elites.2 7 Added to this reality, in
much of the world, the populations of large areas of cities exist unheard,

use, in environmental regulation of complicated issues such as global warming, of multilayered regulation as "dynamic" and positive); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REv.
835 (2008) (arguing that, even in the event of federal climate change regulation, there
should be a significant role for the variety of state regulatory programs).
22. EDESIO FERNANDES, LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN BRAZIL 43 (1995).
23. Id at 44.
24. Patrick McAuslan, Urbanization, Law and Development: A Record of Research, in
ILLEGAL CITIES 18, 39 (Eddsio Fernandes & Ann Varley eds., 1998).
25. Frug, supra note 18, at 1101-06.
26. Id.
27. Ann Varley, The Political Uses of Illegality: Evidence From Urban Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 172, 172-90.
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parallel to, or effectively operating outside of the official legal structure. 28
Yet elsewhere, customary, heterogeneous land use practices may interfere
with the ability of either the government-national, state, or local-or the
private market to express itself, so that customary systems co-exist, albeit
uncomfortably, with the private market and governmental regulations. 29 In
sum, however, the result is a silencing of local voices.
B.

Defining Interests Within Cities

This begs the question, what "city," exactly, would be given a voice if
we were to craft a participatory role for urban populations in the climate
change debates? As noted at the outset of this Article, a majority of the
world's population now lives in cities, most of them in conditions of distress-from moderate to extreme poverty. 30 An additional feature of much
of this land occupation is that it can be characterized as extra-legal. That
is, vast swaths of the slum settlements that constitute the living conditions
of the world's majority exist outside of the formal state in which they exist.
In practical terms, this can refer to those millions who live in cities without
access to municipal services like roads, water, and sewage, 3 1 and also for
those who live in areas within cities controlled by violent criminal enterprises such that the areas are off-limits to the police, other public safety,
and municipal services. 32 This reality should give pause to those making
climate policy at the national and international level; the views of significant portions of the global population may not be given voice at those decision making levels. 33 Surely good public policy and effective legislation
for climate change-or any issue of import-must take into account the
28. See, e.g., Martin Delfin, UN Troops Under Fire in Haitian Slum, EL PAiS (Spain),

Feb. 14, 2007, at 4 (discussing a gun battle in Port-au-Prince's Soleil slum, which is considered one of Haiti's most dangerous); Jeffrey Gettleman, Chased by Gang Violence, Residents Flee Kenyan Slum, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at A4 (discussing gang violence in
Mathare, a group of Kenyan slums outside Nairobi, and noting that "[t]he area is notorious
as a pocket of anarchy in a relatively orderly city").
29. Alain Durand-Lasserve, Law and Urban Change in Developing Countries: Trends
and Issues, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 233, 235-36 (discussing the distinctiveness
of francophone Africa).
30. STATE OF WORLD POPULATION, supra note 5.
31. See, e.g., Winnie V. Mitullah & Kivutha Kibwana, A Tale of Two Cities: Policy,
Law and Illegal Settlements in Kenya, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 191, 202-03 (describing characteristics of extra-legal settlements in Nairobi).
32. E.g., Rogelio Perez Perdomo & Teolinda Bolivar, Legal Pluralism in Caracas,
Venezuela, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 123, 133.
33. See Eddsio Fernandes & Ann Varley, Law, the City and Citizenship in Developing
Countries: An Introduction, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 3 ("[W]e find that an average of 40 per cent and in some cases as much as 70 per cent of the population of the major
cities are living in illegal conditions."); see also supra note 6.
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views of those it seeks to help and whose behavior it will regulate.3 4 At the
same time, identifying appropriate representatives of those populations will
be no easy task.
Consequently, official, legal governments cannot necessarily be understood to represent urban populations the world over. For many, the rule of
law shapes daily life in only the most formal sense. 35 Therefore, some
more pluralist model must be adopted to introduce urban voices-whether
characterized as "local," "municipal," or "city" representatives-at the climate change policy roundtable. The fact that so much of the world's population remains effectively disenfranchised from the policy decisions that
affect them indicates that all of us must demand a search for a more inclusive governance model, one that applies participatory as well as representative democratic principles to climate change governance. 36 In short, this is
to advocate consideration of a pluralist model to reshape climate change
governance.
Legal pluralism recognizes the diversity of existing judicial systems, often within the same society. Although pluralism does not necessarily maintain that all such orders are normatively justified (or justifiable), pluralism
does, at a minimum, support a view like the following: I recognize the existence of a non-state legal order and also understand that this order may contradict the moral or political values of the larger political and social order
where it is located. 37 Initially, legal anthropologists and sociologists turned
to pluralism to defend the legal and social orders of indigenous and traditional communities. 38 More recently, legal pluralism has been used to defend the interests of what might be called the "urban disenfranchised"-

34. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Leonardo Avritzer, Introduction: Opening Up
the Canon of Democracy, in DEMOCRATIZING DEMOCRACY: BEYOND THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC CANON xxxiv-lxix (Boaventura de Sousa Santos ed., 2005).
35. See, e.g., Perdomo & Bolivar, supra note 32, at 127 ("[T]he legality/illegality dualism presupposes the existence of an ordered society in which the rule of law prevails and in
which both citizens and government acknowledge their responsibility to observe or to ensure the observance of legal norms."); see also S~rgio de Azevedo, Law and the Future of
Urban Management in the Third World Metropolis, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at
258, 261 ("In the complex and rapidly changing societies of most developing countries, political participation cannot be limited to traditional institutional channels of representation
(the right to elect and to stand for election). It requires other, more direct, forms of democracy for citizenship rights to be fully realized, especially at the local level. In short, the
management of public affairs is too important to be left to the government.").
36. de Sousa Santos & Avritzer, supra note 34, at lxvi (insisting on "new complementarities" between participatory and representative democracy).
37. See, e.g., John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1
(1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW& SoC'Y REv. 869 (1998).
38. See Merry, supra note 37, at 875-79.
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that is, the urban poor of so many of the world's largest cities. 39 Interestingly, some research suggests that the legal orders observed and implemented in such communities often mirror the practices of the larger society
(for example, in establishing land title and developing systems to mediate
land conflicts). 40 A pluralist framework offers a mechanism to identify
concurrent legal or social orders within nation-states.
In the climate change context, a pluralist model would permit urban interests to be identified and brought to climate change discussion. A powerful advantage of using such a model would be to help refocus the climate
change debate away from the "developed" versus "developing" country
distinction.4 1 Such an effort would incorporate into climate change analysis and discussion not only questions of inequality between states but also
inequality within states, comparing the behaviors of those who do not have
and consume little within given countries against those who have and consume in those same countries. This will likely have the effect of demonstrating how the "haves" in the developing countries benefit from this inequality, revealing their role in producing climate change, while also
identifying similar interests among the global poor, whether in "developed"
or "developing" countries, including the heightened risks that the global
poor face from climate change, a fact that has been extensively documented.42 A likely consequence of thus redefining the appropriate parties
in climate change discussions would be to deepen our understanding of the
challenges of successful climate policy change in the mega-urban centers
where most people now live, and where they are projected to continue to
concentrate.
Such an approach may be justified on several grounds. First and most
obviously, it would satisfy the commitment to equitable solutions articulated in the Framework Convention on Climate Change. 43 More concretely, it could reinforce another central objective of the Framework Convention: namely the desire to reduce both anthropogenic carbon emissions

39. See generally Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Extralegal Property, Legal Monism, and
Pluralism, U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (unpublished draft manuscript

on file with author).
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Doran & Ginnochio, supra note 16, at 35-41.
42. Id. at 50 n.88.
43. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3(l)-(3), May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf
[hereinafter UNFCC]. Article 3(1) articulates a commitment equity to "protect the climate
system". Article 3(3) creates a duty of "taking into account different socio-economic contexts" and to "comprise all economic sectors" in defining policies and measures to address
climate change.
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and poverty.4 4 The voices of unrepresented parties in climate change governance can presumably speak more eloquently to what is needed to improve their quality of life, while also implementing strategies to reduce the
effects of global warming than can their official representatives.
In addition, there are positive social utilities to incorporating a voice for
cities at the table of climate change governance. First, there are significant
spillover effects from the limited regulation of slums and shantytowns; the
better-to-do cannot insulate themselves from the violence and other social
and environmental ills produced by their less well-off neighbors.4 5 Indeed,
it appears that when the better-to-do try to insulate themselves, by, for example, choosing "to meet their housing needs in enclosed condominium
developments connected to the central areas via motorways, light rail or
metro systems,"4 6 their actions serve only to increase urban sprawl and its
negative consequences for climate change, such as an increase in impermeable surfaces and vehicle miles traveled. 47 Bringing disenfranchised representatives of urban populations to the table in climate change negotiations
might promote workable solutions that take account of the lives led by
many of the world's urban residents. On climate-related issues such as

44. The Preamble to the UNFCC affirms, among other things, "that responses to climate
change should be coordinated with social and economic development in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding adverse impacts on the latter, taking into account the legitimate
priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth
and the eradication of poverty .... " See also id. art. 4(7).
45. For example, in Brazil, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank,
in cooperation with other investors, engaged in remediation problems for important water
resources in SAo Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the country's two largest cities. Both the River
Tiet:, in Sao Paulo, and the Bay of Guanabara, in Rio de Janeiro, had been seriously polluted by unregulated industrial and sewage discharges-the latter largely coming from the
shantytowns, or favelas, that surround the cities. See SERGIO MARGULIS ET AL., BRAZIL:
MANAGING WATER QUALITY, MAINSTREAMNG THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE WATER SECTOR

19-48 (2002), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WD
SP/IB/2003/03/15/000094946_03030404241233/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf; see also
VICTOR COELHO, BAIA DE GUNABARA: UMA HIST&RIA DE UMA AGRESSAO AMBIENTAL [BAT
DE GUNABARA: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGGRESSION] 214-22 (2007) (concluding

that the poor urbanization surrounding the Bay contributes to its continuing degradation and
development plans for the communities need to be implemented gradually but deliberately,
and only then will environmental quality improve).
46. Azevedo, supra note 35, at 261-62,
47. Michael M. Maya, Note, Transportation Planning and the Prevention of Urban
Sprawl, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 879, 884 (2008) (discussing the costs of urban sprawl which include a considerable increase in the average distance suburbanites traveled between home
and work since the beginning of the 1980s); Patrick Moulding, Note, Fare or Unfair? The
Importance of Mass Transitfor America's Poor, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 155,
168-69 (2005) (noting that highway construction not only has negative environmental consequences on the poor but also disproportionately impacts their neighborhoods).
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transportation and spatial planning,4 8 the solutions might surprise us if generated by a base that includes urban populations.
This assumes that the interests and perspectives of governments and
their representatives, like those of the carbon-producing industries within
their borders, may diverge from those of the world's urban poor.49 This
further assumes that, in the long-term, solutions will not be workable unless
developed and supported by all sectors of national populations. In fact, the
"search for broader economic and political solutions" is often impeded by
mistrust or lack of familiarity between the urban poor, and the social and
economic actors responsible for the operation of the formal state and econ50
omy.
Incorporating such urban voices in climate change governance can lead
to more efficient solutions. Including a wider range of urban voices in the
process of formulating climate change policy may force serious discussion,
for example, about densification in planning (and how to achieve it), rather
than continued toleration of the climate-negative effects of urban sprawl.
This would be possible because the broader model of participation envisaged here would result in a vigorous discussion among all social and economic actors. A collateral benefit of broader participation is that it would
highlight internal differences within societies that could only help sharpen
the tools with which climate change is addressed. 51 For example, in international negotiations, China and India have been among the loudest "developing" nation voices insisting that "developed" nations should not be
allowed to inhibit their carbon emissions until they reached a comparable
stage of development, even as their carbon emissions soared.52 However,

48. See UNFCC, supra note 43, art. 4(l)(c) (mentioning transportation planning requirements); see also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 10(b)(i), Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (creating transportation and spatial planning commitments).
49. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
50. Azevedo, supra note 35, at 262. Azevedo acknowledges that because of urban violence, the tendency of the middle class is to physically isolate themselves from the poor, and
that:
the middle class reaction is an understandable response to the rise in urban crime
and violence. However, the habit of regarding the 'other' (from a lower social
group) as a potential enemy tends to reinforce ideological prejudices in the elite,
undermining the search for broader economic and political solutions such as a reduction in the amount of absolute poverty ....
Id.
51. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Deborah E. Cooper, The Kyoto Protocol and China: Global Warming's
Sleeping Giant, 11 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 401, 407-08 (1999) (discussing the "fundamental rift" in the approach to climate change between developed and developing countries). For information regarding current emissions figures see Neth. Envtl. Assessment
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such emissions come at a cost, typically for the most politically, socially
and economically disenfranchised members of those societies.5 3 At the
same time, the elites in those societies typically demonstrate the most carbon-consumptive behaviors of their brethren in "developed" societies.
Conversely, as the proliferation of climate change policies from U.S. cities
reflects, there are significant constituencies in some localities concerned to
reduce their carbon footprint. 4 Inserting local voices into climate change
negotiations would likely make these internal differences more evident.
Thus, it would be possible to craft responses that recognize the behaviors
and needs of entire populations rather than narrow segments of individual
societies.
At present, however, such a discussion is difficult. The structure of climate change discussions effectively blocks local voices.

I1. CONSEQUENCES OF NOT HEARING FROM CITIES IN CLIMATE
CHANGE DEBATE

In much U.S. legal scholarship and policy analysis of climate change,
climate change conflicts tend to be addressed as matters that can be resolved along one of three axes: among nations (multi-lateral discussions
among global legal institutions), between two nations (bilateral), and between a national government and its states or other administrative units (intra-national). In addition, because many, if not most, analysts tend to view
climate change as an economic problem that can be addressed in part by the
law and not as an environmentalproblem with economic and social causes
that can be addressed in part with legal solutions, much U.S. writing tends
to reject the most popular proposals to address climate change as politically
impractical, unpalatable, and/or unfair to the United States.5 5 Even when
analysts avow an interest in resolving the seriousness of climate change,

Agency, China Now No. I in C0 2 Emissions; USA in Second Position, July 24, 2008, http://

www.mnp.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/moreinfo/Chinanowno 1inCO2emissionsUSAinsec
ondposition.html (noting that in 2006 China surpassed the United States as the largest emitter of carbon dioxide). See also Emma Graham-Harrison & Chris Buckley, China says
Greenhouse Gases Catch up with U.S., REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.reuters.

com/article/naturalResources/idUSPEK12708120081029 (quoting a Chinese official who
stated "our total [greenhouse gas] emissions are about the same as the United States").
53. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 65 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4

_syr.pdf ("There are sharp differences across regions and those in the weakest economic
position are often the most vulnerable to climate change and are frequently the most susceptible to climate-related damages, especially when they face multiple stresses.").
54. See supranote 16.
55. See David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism's Shotgun
Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21 (2008).
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the cross-national and economic focus tends to result in conclusions that
have the effect of tolerating the status quo, rather than pressing for a reconsideration of its basic features.
A recent article by Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein helps to illustrate the
point.56 Their analysis of the deficits of cross-national efforts to resolve
climate change is fairly typical in two respects: (a) its conclusion that most
such solutions are deeply unfair to some national actors, notably the United
States;5 7 and (b) in its assumption that the most promising solutions for climate change are economic in nature, specifically either a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax. 58 Although they assert that it is not their intention "to
sketch a positive approach to climate change," 59 the net consequence of
their analysis serves to inhibit any efforts to resolve climate change problems bilaterally or multilaterally. Posner and Sunstein do appear to believe
that the United States has erred in not entering into global climate change
commitments. 60 In fact, they believe that some mixture of welfarist or
61
other policies probably should be adopted with respect to climate change.
Nonetheless, their analysis of the principal justifications, and notably the
distributive and corrective justice defenses, for climate change policy, by
failing to push for workable solutions to climate change, could also well
have the result of encouraging continued inaction.
Posner and Sunstein begin by likening the threat of climate change to
that of an asteroid hitting the earth:
[A]ssume that all nations are threatened by [an] asteroid .... But the risk
is not identical. Because of its adaptive capacity, its location, its technology, and a range of other factors, assume that the United States is less
vulnerable to serious
damage than (for example) India and the nations of
62
Africa and Europe.
From this example 63 of an asteroid hit, Posner and Sunstein continue to
suggest that distributional or corrective justice justifications for climate

56. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEo. L.J. 1565

(2008).
57. Id. at 1568.
58. Id. at 1574-75; see also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 48, art. 17 (outlining a framework for emissions trading).
59. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1612.
60. See id. at 1568-69.
61. Id. at 1570.
62. Id. at 1584.
63. The example is laden, one might note, with unexplained assumptions that might be
said to reveal a nationalistic hubris. Why is our adaptive capacity necessarily greater than
that of nations that are the lineal descendents of civilizations dating back centuries if not
millennia? What if our technology fails us?
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change action are, at best, "highly imperfect" 64 and "crude arguments" (because they do not appeal to any compelling national interest) at worst.65
The distributional justice argument, in basic outline, goes something like
this: because climate change is a global problem with disproportionate effects on poorer regions of the world, it behooves the world's richer nations
(which also happen to be some of the more heavily-polluting) to invest
more in solving the problem. 66 Posner and Sunstein reject this because,
they argue, "[i]t is not at all clear that [redistribution] should take the particular form of a deal in which the United States joins an agreement that is
not in its interest., 67 They further maintain that distributional justice to address climate change, either by way of income transfer by rich nations to
poor nations or heavy emission reductions limits of richer countries, simply
does not make (economic) sense: "purely as an instrument of redistribution,
68
emissions reductions on the part of the United States are quite crude."
Why? Because, they continue, "there is a highly imperfect connection between distributive goals on the one hand and requiring wealthy countries to
pay for emissions reductions on the other." 69 Thus, they quite simply are
not convinced that a compelling justification can be identified for the application of distributive justice principles to combating climate change on a
global scale. They acknowledge as follows:
[I]t is quite possible that IOOX is better spent on malaria nets and AIDS
drugs than on global emissions control, if the only goal is to help the poor.
To be sure, it may be that, in fact, the best way to spend X is to cut greenhouse gas emissions. It is possible, for example, that more lives are saved
from cutting greenhouse gas emissions than from distributing malaria nets
and AIDS drugs, given a constant amount of money and taking into account that future lives and current lives must be put on a common metric.
We cannot exclude this possibility, but we can say that the match70 between
greenhouse gas reductions and distributive justice is quite crude.
Posner and Sunstein further buttress their arguments with counterarguments, only to shoot them down in short order. They continue to explain, for example, that choosing to cut greenhouse emissions instead of
giving direct aid "might be counted as a virtue because the governments of

64. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1611 (speaking specifically of corrective
justice).
65. Id.at 1612.
66. See id.at 1570.
67. Id.at 1584.
68. Id.at 1587.
69. Id.
70. Id.at 1588.
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many poor states are either inefficient or corrupt (or both),"'" a reason that
many programs transferring aid from developed to developing nations have
failed to succeed. By this logic, cutting greenhouse emissions-likely by
means of cap-and-trade programs or a carbon tax-would be preferred to
any other form of aid. Yet, once again, for various reasons, including the
uncertain future payoff of present action and the possibility of corruption in
the distribution of carbon-reduction permits, the moral appeal of distributive justifications for climate policy are suspect for them. 72 The tautological character of these arguments merit attention: foreign aid (nation to nation) tends-they say-to fall into the wrong hands, and, even though aid
to help address some of the health side effects of climate and environmental change merits our compassion, moral sentiment should not guide us
because it will just be diverted by corruption. 3 Therefore, Posner and Sunstein's analysis implies, we should take our hearts off our sleeves, forget
poverty reduction and pursue (it is suggested, if not stated) those solutions
to global problems like climate change in our national (and perhaps common) economic interest. Quietly and efficiently, their analysis thus pushes
redistributive claims to the side. Therefore, in short, distributive justice
proves for them intellectually flabby-at least as a justification for multilateral resolution of climate change problems.
Corrective justice arguments are similarly unavailing for Posner and
Sunstein. As they explain, "[c]orrective justice arguments are backwardlooking, focused on wrongful behavior that occurred in the past."' 74 This is
the argument typically advanced by countries with developing economies
undergoing spectacular industrial growth, like China and India: despite
their new status as heavy greenhouse gas emitters, the nations first to industrialize, they say, bear more responsibility now because of their historical
contribution to the problem. Although they acknowledge that the corrective justice problem is "lamentably complex," Posner and Sunstein maintain that:
"The most general point, summarizing the argument as a whole, is that the
climate change problem poorly fits the corrective justice model, because
the consequence of tort-like thinking would be to force many people who
have not acted wrongfully
to provide a remedy to many people who have
75
not been victimized.

71. Id. at 1589.
72. See id. at 1590.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1592.
75. Id. It should be noted, moreover, that there are areas of tort law in which we accept
that corrective justice principles are inadequate to compensate directly for all harms, but al-
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That is to say, for example, that an environmentally conscious North
American, who lives in a small apartment, takes the bus or rides her bike to
work, and generally adopts behaviors designed to reduce her carbon footprint should not be required to shift assets (in the form of taxes that would
then be transferred as financial assistance from the United States) to a
country like India, where a newly rich titan of industry, living in an enormous mansion and getting around in fancy, gas-guzzling imported sports
cars, is significantly contributing to the problem, at least as judged individually. Thus, application of corrective justice principles is for Posner and
Sunstein a dead end:
The basic problem for corrective justice is that dead wrongdoers cannot
be punished or held responsible for their behavior, or forced to compensate those they have harmed. At first glance, holding Americans today responsible for the activities of their ancestors is not fair or reasonable on
are not the relevant
corrective justice grounds, because current Americans
76
wrongdoers; they are not responsible for the harm.
This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for them to endorse corrective
justice as a justification for climate change policy and response: such justifications rely heavily upon "notions of collective responsibility that are not
easy to defend."-77 Certainly if one analyzes climate change problems as
matters for state resolution by use of corrective justice to effect economic
redistribution at an international scale, this may be true.
Posner and Sunstein maintain that their goal "has been to clarify the uses
and limits" of distributional and corrective justice arguments, "in a way
that might bear not only on climate change, but also on a wide range of
other questions raised when some nations make claims on others." 78 Yet
despite this recognition, they remain open to the criticism that they have
boxed themselves in by their nation-centric perspective. Because their
units of analysis are the nations at the table of climate change discussions,
they are not forced to grapple with the mosaic of climate change effects enlow compensation nonetheless. A notable example is market share liability. See, e.g.,

RE-

STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. o (Tentative Draft No. 5,
2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 26 cmt. n (2000); RE-

STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b), (c) (1979). In the environmental context, an example is joint and several strict liability for a wide range of actors, including those who did
not actually cause the harm. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2002). Of course, these examples do not
mirror the situation described by Posner and Sunstein, whereby some who did not harm are
compensating some who have not been harmed.
76. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1593.
77. Id. at 1602. As noted above, tort law deals, if imperfectly, with compensation for
collective harms all the time.
78. Id.at 1612.
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places who happen to live on one side or another of a
dured by people and
79
national boundary.
It should be emphasized that Posner and Sunstein, and many others like
them, are not foes of climate regulation, or at least not of policies that may
increase quality of life and standard of living, making adaptation to climate
change more broadly possible. 80 Nonetheless, their argument figuratively
rejects a search for inclusive climate change solutions and is nation-centric
in its examination of the problem. It assumes that the poor within the borders of each state are represented by and cared for by their respective governments. Yet, in a world evermore characterized by income inequality
within nations,8 1 this is arguably not a correct, much less a useful or informative way to analyze such redistributive or corrective justice possibilities.
The elite in Sdo Paulo, Mexico City, or Mumbai, for example, are likely to
have far more in common with the elite in Washington, D.C., London, or
Frankfurt, just as the most economically and socially disadvantaged members of each of those places has more in common with their counterparts

79. It should be stressed that this criticism relies upon the conclusion that the limitations
of their argument are typical rather than unique. Richard Stewart and Jonathan Wiener, for
example, similarly favor entry of the United States into multilateral climate agreements yet
note, with some sympathy, the reasons U.S. interests object to doing so. See Stewart &
Wiener, supra note 3, at 51-52 (observing that "the advantages and disadvantages of joining
the Kyoto Protocol 'as is' appear to us to be fairly closely balanced").
80. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1584-85. The authors note that:
If resources should be redistributed from rich to poor on the ground that redistribution would increase overall welfare or promote fairness, the intuition appears
sound. But there is an immediate problem: If redistribution from rich nations to
poor nations is generally desirable, it is not at all clear that it should take the particular form of a deal in which the United States joins an agreement that is not in
its interest. Other things being equal, the more sensible kind of redistribution
would be a cash transfer, so that poor nations can use the money as they see fit.
Perhaps India would prefer to spend the money on education, or on AIDS prevention, or on health care generally. If redistribution is what is sought, a generous
deal with respect to the threat of an asteroid collision seems a crude way of
achieving it.
Id.
81. Media Eghbal, Brazil's New Middle Class Has a Growing Appetite for Consumption, EUROMONITOR INT'L, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.euromonitor.com/Brazils new_
middleclass has agrowingappetite for consumption (noting that in 2006 the richest
10% accounted for 46% of national income, which is slightly higher than a decade ago);
David Cay Johnston, Income Gap Is Widening, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007, at
Cl (noting that in the United States, in 2005, the top 10% of Americans collected 48.5% of
reported income up from roughly 33% in the late 1970's); Hu Jintao Vows to Reverse Income Disparity, HINDU, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/10/16/stories/200710
1654761400.htm (stating that China's richest 10% hold more than 40% of the nation's
wealth and that regionally the GDP of the wealthiest province is more than ten times that of
the poorest province). Income inequality is a growing characteristic of U.S. society as well.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Gudrais, Unequal America, HARV. MAG., July-Aug. 2008, at 22.
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elsewhere. This Article suggests that examining the behaviors of these
groups in terms of their class and social privilege could help us rethink national debate and evaluate individual and social class behaviors in climate
change dialogue. Perhaps by defining shared legal, social, and economic
interests across national boundaries, justifications for redistributive or corrective action could be identified that would simultaneously address poverty and the excessive burden that climate change promises to impose on
the world's poor.
III. REFOCUSING THE CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE AND NORM
ARTICULATION BY CITY VOICES

Focusing on the behaviors and necessities of the urban poor across the
world's cities may help clarify the most appropriate mechanisms to arrest
climate change for at least three reasons. First, the slums of major cities
concentrate populations and thus common interests and needs. Second, by
virtue of this concentration, the urban environments where most people live
literally can be hothouses, both in temperature and social condition, that
bring into focus the problems that most merit attention. Third, such focus
will redirect attention to urban land uses. Land use practices represent the
second-largest challenge in addressing climate change, yet are usually understood only in terms of agriculture and forestry uses.82 Surely urban land
use merits inclusion in this category as well, demanding our attention to the
ways in which land is used, and by whom, in the dominant form of human
habitation today.
Because the shape of cities is a land use issue, we should give special attention to the mechanisms of growth in the world's cities. Furthermore, as
already noted, because many of the world's urban residents are not effectively represented in urban decision making, there is urgency to identify
more participatory mechanisms to assure that the voices of more urban
residents are incorporated into this process. Before articulating the normative values that including urban voices in climate change governance might
generate, however, it is important understand what voices are presently

82. Daniel Bodansky, International Sectoral Agreements in a Post-2012 Climate
Framework 12 (May 2007) (unpublished working paper, available at http://www.pewclimate.com/docUploads/lnternational%20Sectoral%2Aggreements%20in%20a%2OPost2012%20Climate%20Framework.pdf) [hereinafter Bodansky, InternationalSectoral] (noting that land use is the second highest source of increased anthropogenic carbon emissions).
Oddly, however, and following Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change and United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change practice, "land use" is defined as referring to agriculture and forestry only. As understood here, this requires viewing land use in
its largest, most comprehensive sense, including urban use of land as well.
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heard and the justifications for listening to them as opposed to more localized voices.
A.

Who Is Heard in Climate Change Discussions

One is hard-pressed to find U.S. climate change analysts who focus on
urban groups, especially the poor who constitute the majority of the
world's urban population. In addition to global political institutions and
national governments, analysts note the roles of "multinational corporate"
interests in the definition of new "assumptive frameworks" about energy
sources and supplies. 83 The perspectives of non-governmental organizations also merit consideration. 84 There is also a pronounced sectoral analysis from those who believe that we should focus first on responses among
industrial and economic "sectors" (the manufacturing sector, the transportation sector, and the energy sector)," either in the first instance or as part of
86
an "integrated" strategy that includes bilateral and multilateral responses.
There are also many who argue that state (that is, intra-national) administrative units should have primacy over national (and in the case of the
United States, at least, federal) government control.87
At the international and national levels, it is argued that for the purpose
of uniformity, national actors are better equipped than smaller political and
administrative units to prevent the proverbial "race to the bottom." 88 Thus,
in global climate change matters, the subsidiarity principle, which dictates
that the smallest possible administrative unit should be used to resolve
problems, is found wanting:
[T]he traditional arguments for decentralization of authority over local
drinking water, land use, and the like do not apply with equivalent force.
Under the principle of subsidiarity, the global nature of climate change
would counsel greater centralization of policy decisions into national, if

83. Doran & Ginnochio, supra note 16, at 5.
84. Kal Raustiala & Natalie L. Bridgeman, Nonstate Actors In The Global Climate Regime (UCLA Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 0729, 2007), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-1028603.
85. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 21, at 1502.
86. Daniel Bodansky & Elliot Diringer, Towards an Integrated Multi-Track Climate
Framework (Dec. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/
docUploads/Multi-Track-Report.pdf). For Bodansky and Diringer, the "bottom-up" approach refers to national proposals advanced for international consideration.
87. See Adler, supra note 3, at 445 n.15 (citing various articles articulating preference
for state or local climate control legislation in the United States); Driesen, supra note 14, at
41.
88. Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal EnvironmentalRegulation:
A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997).

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XX-XVI

not international,
hands, and less authority for state and local govern89
ments.
A basic problem represented by such conclusions, however, is that neither government and industry, 90 nor "environmentalists" 91 may represent
the interests of most of the world's overwhelmingly poor and increasingly
urban population. For this reason, the notion that the subsidiarity principle
only allows global responses turns the principle on its head.
Some proposals reflect an attempt to account for inter- and intra-national
difference, such as the "integrated multi-track" proposal advocated by the
Pew Center on Global Climate Change. 92 Clearly, there are administrative
advantages to such approaches, not least the likelihood of securing recipro93
cal commitments and uniform, predictable results.
In contrast, concerns proliferate about localized decision-making in the
climate change context. Some are familiar from other contexts, such as
worries about rent-seeking behavior 94 and free riders. 95 Other concerns are
based on the global reality of climate change, the magnitude of which requires international agreement. 96 Once again, however, even with proposals that strive to respect differences in national conditions, 97 it remains true
that much of the world's population is not represented by governments or
major social and private corporate institutions. Thus, if we are truly to address global climate change, there must be a mechanism established to include these subordinated voices.
B.

Towards New Governance Norms: Some Benefits of Listening to
Cities and Shantytowns

One might ask what cities would have to add to the climate change debate that is not already known. In the course of considering these benefits,
however, it is important also to acknowledge the potential practical diffi-

89. Adler, supra note 3, at 447-48 (emphasis added).
90. Bodansky & Diringer, supra note 86, at 7-19.
91. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 21, at 1541-43 (delineating arguments that would
likely be advanced by "environmentalists").
92. Bodansky, InternationalSectoral, supra note 82.
93. Bodansky & Diringer, supra note 86, at 5.
94. See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the
Green Curtain, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM:

GOING BEHIND THE GREEN 1, 8-9 (Terry

L. Anderson ed., 2000) (summarizing examples of regional rent-seeking in environmental
law).
95. Adler, supra note 3, at 448.
96. Id. at 447-48.
97. See, e.g., Bodansky, InternationalSectoral, supra note 82.
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culties of giving city or local voices a greater role in the development of
climate change law and policy.
1.

Adding Unheard Voices

Large swaths of the world's cities now exist off the official grid. Often,
these areas are effectively off-limits to official authorities. 98 The result is
the growth of cities that can resemble more of a collection of city-states in
the medieval mold, where security and services are controlled within the
community rather than provided across communities9 9 than the urbansuburban or regional government and cooperative models more familiar to
English-speaking North America and Europe. As a result, the people making the policy and enacting the laws that nominally govern an area within a
city in fact have little functional authority over it, much less a notion of
how life is lived there. This can only have a negative effect on efforts to
apply policy (of whatever kind) to such areas. In the context of climate
change, this matters because redesigning our urban environments should be
a key goal of climate change response.
As noted at the outset of this Article, for instance, many urban environments are increasingly quite violent.' 00 This is hardly surprising, since
residents are crammed together with inadequate services, little green space
or other recreational areas, few employment opportunities, and, often, poor
sanitation. Importantly, these conditions also have consequences for climate change policy. Several examples can be cited that reflect the connection of slum growth and climate change. For example, expanding urban areas, and mostly expansion of unplanned growth by urban migrants, is
rapidly eating up precious forests-forests that provide irreplaceable carbon sinks. 10 1 This is true in countries as different from one another as Bra-

98. See, e.g., Tranqiilidadee tensdo nas fronteirasda cidade partida [Tranquility and
tension on the border of the divided city], JORNAL Do BRASIL (Braz.), July 27, 2008, at A20

(noting the absence of the state in the shantytowns of Rio de Janeiro, despite their proximity
to prosperous neighborhoods).
99. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 17 (reporting that "[i]n the Amazon, one of the world's fastest-growing urban frontiers, 80 percent of city growth has been in shantytowns largely unserved by established utilities and municipal transport").
100. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
101. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6; Mary Christina
Wood, Law and Climate Change: Government's Atmospheric Trust Responsibility, 38
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10652, 10659 (2008) (maintaining that we should protect
remaining carbon sinks that have capacity to cleanse the atmosphere of carbon); Mark
Squillace, From "Navigable Waters" to "Constitutional Waters": The Future of Federal
Wetlands Regulation, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 799, 808 (2007) (observing that "wetlands,
like forests, provide a substantial carbon sink that can help mitigate the impact of climate
change").
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zil, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, where rainforests are daily
threatened by urban expansion.1 1 2 Another example to be cited relates to
sanitation. The lack of sanitation has implications for climate changerelated issues as varied as sedimentation in water courses and the water
quality of coastlines.1" 3 However, these problems cannot be solved merely
with the imposition of international trading schemes in carbon dioxide or a
uniform carbon tax. Specifically, correcting these effects demands an integrated approach that understands urban poverty reduction as a central element in any climate change policy. For example, investments in housing
and education might indeed be understood as part of a climate change in04
vestment program with both broadly and narrowly focused goals.1
This should not be understood as essential merely by appeal to a moral
interest, as some commentators contend. 5 On the contrary, there is an
immediate and pressing interest in violence reduction in urban slums for
those both inside and outside of the countries where such violence occurs.
This is so in the first instance because of spillover social and environmental
effects. 0 6 For example, the economy of many slums in South America is
sustained by drug and, specifically, cocaine traffic, with the demand for
those drugs coming principally from Europe and English-speaking North
America.' 0 7 Growing coca plants has consequences for agricultural land
102. Colin Crawford, ProtectingEnvironmentally-Sensitive Areas and Promoting Tourism in "The Back Patio of the United States ":Thoughts about Shared Responsibilities in
Ecosystem and Biodiversity Protection, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 41, 63-81 (20062007); Colin Crawford, The Insistent (and Unrelenting) Challenges of ProtectingBiodiversity in Brazil: Finding "The Law That Sticks," 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 1, 15-19
(2007); Colin Crawford, Social and Cultural Protection and Environmental Justice: Lessons
of the Colombian Model (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
103. Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz et al., FreshwaterResources and Their Management, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY. CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL

PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 173, 178-79 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at
(discussing the
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter3.pdf
effects of climate change on water quality in freshwater systems); Robert J. Nicholls et al.,
Coastal systems and low-lying areas, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION,
AND VULNERABILITY. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I1TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Supra, at 315, 319,

available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter6.pdf (dis-

cussing the effects of increasing human utilization of coastal zones).
104. In contrast to the view of Posner & Sunstein, for example, who appear to assume
that expenditures for education, housing or other social goals are not correlated to climate
control. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1584-85.
105. See, e.g., id. at 1572.
106. Driesen, supra note 55, at 21 (maintaining that various spillover effects are not well
accounted for by market liberalism).
107. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2008 WORLD DRUG REPORT 70 (2008),
available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR2008_eng web.pdf
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use, and thus for climate policy.' 0 8 But it also helps to sustain centers of
violence, and a culture that creates parallel judicial orders within states and
cities.1" 9 Such drug-controlled communities largely exist apart from the
110
formal state.
Thus, one needs to ask, how can green space initiatives, new sanitation
systems, or efficient transportation systems-all essential elements of a
climate change strategy-be introduced in such areas? One way to begin
to address this question would be through the application of a judicial pluralist framework that would attempt to do two things. First, it would recognize the existence of such parallel orders as a first step in bringing disenfranchised voices into the climate change debate. Second, it would seek to
accommodate the values and needs reflected in such parallel orders within
the larger state. This is not, it should be stressed, to argue that a drug lord
in control of a shantytown deserves a seat at the table in international climate change negotiations. However, community voices from disenfranchised urban areas need, somehow, to be systematically integrated into
climate change discussions.
Far from being based in abstract moral commitments like Posner's and
Sunstein's straw men of distributive or corrective justice, the spillover effects could threaten the well-being of the better-off not only in "developing" countries, but in their more prosperous neighbors as well. Suppose,
for example, that Brazil's hot, dry summer of 2006 continued for more than
one year-along with the violence that characterized that year. This could
(stating that in 2007 the total area under coca cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru was
448,743 acres, an area slightly smaller than Delaware); U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
WORLD

DRUG

REPORT

2005:

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

16

(2005),

available at

http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR 2005/volume 1 ex summary.pdf (noting that in 2003 the
value of the global illicit drug market was estimated, in U.S. dollars, at $13B at the production level, $94B at the wholesale level, and $322B at the retail level).
108. Cheri-Lynn Wortham, Comment, Methamphetamine and Cocaine Manufacturing
Effects On the Environment And Agriculture, 17 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 343 (20072008); Coca Trade and Land Use Changes (Am. Univ., Case Studies No. 16, 1997), available at http://www.american.eduTED/coca.htm; supra note 6 and accompanying text (detailing the global concern with agricultural land use as a climate change source). In a country like Colombia, where the negative agricultural implications of drug crops are widely
appreciated, this is a frequent subject of academic commentary. See, e.g., Cdsar Ortiz, Agricultura, Cultivos llicitos y Mddio Ambiente en Colombia, in GUERRA, SOCIEDAD Y MEDIO
AMBIENTE 297, 297 (Martha Cdrdenas & Manuel Rodriguez Becerra eds., 2004).
109. See, e.g., ROBERT NEUWIRTH, SHADOW CITIES: A BILLION SQUATTERS, A NEW URBAN WORLD 256-61 (2005); Perez Perdomo & Bolivar, supra note 32, at 133. The United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime promotes programs to give "farmers an economically
viable, legal alternative to growing coca or opium." See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME,
UNODC AND ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternativedevelopment/index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
110. See supra note 109.
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ultimately disrupt the smooth functioning of Brazilian industry, with reverberations in global manufacturing and financial markets."' It could lead to
increased migration-both within nations and across borders, with devastating social and environmental effects. 1 2 In short, it is nai've to suppose
that only "many millions of poor people would be hurt by the cost of emissions reductions .... [bearing] that cost in the form of higher energy bills,
lost jobs, and increased poverty."' 13 Poverty may be a problem, as the adage has it, that will always be with us, but to neglect poverty reduction as
an essential component of climate change policy would be foolhardy. We
can run, but we cannot hide from the disruptions that will result in an ever
hotter and more climate-uncertain planet.
2.

Proposalsfor Infrastructure andLand Reforms: Local Thinking to Aid
Global Action

Another way in which cities would introduce an essential voice in climate change discussions would be with respect to infrastructure planning
and land reform. As noted earlier, land use is cited as a major climate
change sectoral concern. 114 However, as already noted, this typically is
understood to refer to agricultural land use, and not the intensive urban land
use in which most of the world's population is now engaged worldwide. 115
Cities, however, have much to teach-and much to do-in this respect.
For example, urban areas are expanding exponentially, and with them impermeable surfaces that are turning them into heat islands.116 Cities are
also expanding because of deforestation (a consequence of poor planning

111. See Andrew Downie, Brazil's Slums Face a New Problem: Vigilante Militias; Offduty and FormerPolice, Prison Guards, and FirefightersAre Moving in to Oust the Drug
Gangs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 8, 2007 (commenting on the assaults on police sta-

tions, banks, supermarkets, and buses in Sbo Paulo in May 2006 that brought the city to a
standstill); Larry Rohter, Police Are Criticized in Wave of Gang Violence in Brazil, N.Y.

May 30, 2006, at A3 (reporting on the violence in Sdo Paulo in early May 2006 that
left at least 186 dead and brought the city to a standstill).
112. This potential has already been well-documented. See, e.g., Ed~sio Fernandes &
TIMES,

Raquel Rolnik, Law and Urban Change in Brazil, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 140,

140-44 (describing non-participatory urban planning despite high internal urban migration
rates throughout twentieth century); see generally MICHAEL T. KLARE, RESOURCE WARS:
THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT (2001); Gregory S. McCue, Environmental
Refugees: Applying International Environmental Law to Involuntary Migration, 6 GEO.

INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 151, 163-65 (1993) (discussing the often negative effects of mass migrations on the local environment).
113. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1587.
114. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 7-8.

116. HOWARD FRUMK1N ET AL., URBAN SPRAWL AND PUBLIC HEALTH: DESIGNING, PLANNING, AND BUILDING FOR HEALTHY COMMUNITIES 83-89 (2004).
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and/or uncontrolled development), with the resulting loss of vegetative
cover and the carbon heat sinks they constitute.11 7 Moreover, many of the
world's largest cities are coastal and so are8especially susceptible to the sea
level rise accompanying global warming.' 1
However, particularly in the less-developed world, such planning tends
to operate in a "depoliticized and technocratic way" that does not involve
participation from many of those who will, in theory, be subject to its regulation. 119 Many areas targeted for land use regulation effectively fall outside the official urban grid and are not effectively controlled by the central
state. Future climate change-related spatial planning must take this reality
into account. Therefore, any sustained effort to introduce the kind of land
use and environmental planning necessary to reduce heat islands and similar phenomena must be reformulated to take account of these areas and the
views of their residents.
Examples exist of the ordered resolution of social conflicts within even
the poorest slums. Take, for example, the huge satellite city of Bogota, Colombia known as Jerusalem. Jerusalem "is one of the quarters with the
highest number of buildings lacking titles in Ciudad Bolivar."' 2 ° Ciudad
Bolivar, in turn, is located in the southwest part of the city:
[t]he district counts 658,477 inhabitants, 12,998 hectares [50.2 sq. miles],
and 252 quarters. In terms of population it ranks fourth in the city and its
inhabitants represent approximately 10% of the population of [Bogotd]..
. .95% of the population lives in poverty conditions ....[Jerusalem is]
one of the poorest, most populated zones with
the highest number of prob12 1
lems regarding informality in all of Bogotd.
Nonetheless, a relatively ordered, concurrent system of property title transfer exists within Jerusalem and owners object to any title "regularization"
22
of the land's inhabitants without compensation.'

117. R6mulo Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Seeing the Forestfor the Treaties : The Evolving Debates on Forest and Forestry Activities Under the Clean Development Mechanism
Ten Years After the Kyoto Protocol,31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 634, 636-38 (2008).
118. Gordon McGranahan et al., The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of Climate Change
andHuman Settlements in Low Elevation CoastalZones, 19 ENV'T & URBANIZATION 17, 2122 (2007), availableat http://eau.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/19/l/17 (noting that low
elevation coastal zones, defined as land areas contiguous with the coastline up to a ten meter
rise elevation, contain 2% of the world's land and 10% of its population, or slightly more
than 600 million people).
119. See, e.g., Fernandes & Rolnik, supra note 112, at 140. See generally THE CHALLENGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN URBAN AREAS 181-298 (Adrian Atkinson et al.
eds., 2000).
120. Bonilla Maldonado, supra note 39, at 13, 16.
121. Id at 16-17.
122. Id.at 18.
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In other countries, the practical problems may differ from this example
1 23
because extra-legal occupations occur on public and not private land.
That fact does not make their resolution less complicated. Nonetheless,
this Article suggests that a judicial pluralist model that would recognize the
reality of these extra-legal settlements, and the way in which they have ordered land, would constitute an important first step. Doing so would allow
the official state to begin to understand the land use challenges faced by
these communities. In the context of climate change governance, this could
force a discussion about a truly integrated land use plan, one that would
seek to identify solutions that recognize extra-legal development patterns.
By giving a voice to the residents of such shantytowns and extra-legal settlements, it will be possible to identify solutions that both take account of
and seek to respond to their reality. Ultimately, this could lead to difficult
discussions, for example, about achieving density or public spending for
efficient transportation options. This argument makes no assumption that
incorporating such voices will be simple or produce easy-to-achieve solutions. It suggests, however, that in the areas of climate change regulation
involving land and resource use, it is essential to hear from those who stand
most to be affected.
Immediate objections to such a proposal likely will focus on the fact that
the occupations were extra-legal. "These people," it may be said, "have no
right to the land and so do not deserve a place at any table on how to use
it." At a municipal or other local level, however, any such objection would
be rather like insisting that a slang word not be allowed into a dictionary
because it is not "real English." Extra-legal occupations have become a defining aspect of global cities and one that has serious implications for land
use and thus climate change. They must be recognized, therefore, as a central challenge to be addressed by any climate change policy. At least with
respect to land use planning reform, official governments in less developed
countries recognize this by way of programs that seek to "regularize" such

123. For example, in Brazil "occupations" or "invasions" of public land provide constant
fodder for public concern. See, e.g., Luis Felipe Reis, Associaqdo DenunciaDesmatamento
Irregular:Constru 6es de Luxo Avanqam Pela Florestade Tyuca [NeighborhoodAssociation Denounces IrregularDeforestation:Luxury ConstructionsAdvance Towards the Tijuca
NationalForest], JORNAL Do BRASIL (Braz.), July 5, 2008, at R2; Favelas DerrubamAreas
Nobres [Shantytowns Destroy Noble Areas], JORNAL DO BRASIL (Braz.), March 23, 2008, at
R2 (describing how extra-legal occupations have destroyed property values of surrounding
legal settlements by as much as 60%). See generally LAND RIGHTS & INNOVATION: IMPROVING TENURE SECURITY FOR THE URBAN POOR (Geoffrey Payne ed., 2002) (containing essays
on extra-legal occupation and their social, economic, and environmental consequences, on
both public and private land, worldwide); McAuslan, supra note 24.
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areas. 124 However, many such programs do not begin from a pluralist perspective but, instead, seek to impose an external order without considering
the circumstances and realities of those living in shantytowns and extralegal settlements. 21 5 Therefore, future climate change policy will need to
develop new strategies that both recognize and seek to interact with most of
the residents of the world's cities. Part IV of this Article offers a framework to begin to do this. First, however, another benefit of giving voice in
climate change governance to unheard city voices can be noted.
3.

Focus on EnvironmentalJustice in Climate Change Governance

Neglecting cities in climate change debates is likely to have the effect of
minimizing a deeper understanding of the health consequences of climate
change. Specifically, urban areas typically constitute toxic "hot spots," areas where dangerous air and other pollutants are concentrating, with negative effects on their residents. 26 An often-stated concern about the adoption of the most popular climate change solution, namely a carbon trading
system, is that it will intensify the growth of such hot spots. 127 It seems

124. One such example is the "favela-bairro" (shantytown to neighborhood) program in
Rio de Janeiro, funded in part by the Inter-American Development Bank. See InterAmerican Development Bank, Programa de Urbanizacao de Assentamentos Populares do
Rio de Janeiro [Urbanization Program for Popular Settlements of Rio de Janeiro] (project
summary available at MIT's Urban Upgrading Site, http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/
upgrading/case-examples/ce-BL-fav.html) (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
125. Education of technocrats and professionals accustomed to the administration of nonparticipatory, top-down plans is difficult but not impossible. One example of a successful
challenge to such management was the waste management scheme implemented in Accra,
Ghana. See Ben K. Doe & Doris Tetteh, The Working Group Approach to Environmental
Management under the Accra Sustainable Programme, in THE CHALLENGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT INURBAN AREAS, supra note 119, at 171, 178-79.
126. Victor B. Flatt, Gaspingfor Breath: The Administrative Flaws of FederalHazardous Air Pollution Regulation and What We Can Learn from the States, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
107, 111 (2007).
127. Robert N. Stavins, A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate
Change 52-53 (KSG Working Paper No. RWP07-052, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract-1026353 (noting this concern in California debates). But see DeShazo & Freeman,
supra note 21, at 1541-42. The authors state that:
[greenhouse gas, or] GHG emissions that lead to global warming are different
from conventional pollutants. They do not cause harm primarily as a result of local exposures, but because of the stock of GHGs that accumulate in the atmosphere regardless of where the gases are emitted. Nor do they cause interstate spillovers in the traditional sense, by shifting harmful pollutants from one (usually
upwind) jurisdiction to another (usually downwind). Unlike acid rain or the pollutants that create smog, it matters not for global warming whether one is a
downwind or an upwind state. Rather, global warming is more like the destruction
of the ozone layer-it creates externalities on a global scale.
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only logical then, to avoid undesirable secondary effects of climate change
that is globally smart and locally dangerous, that those who stand to be
most affected by the expansion of hot spots-namely the global urban
poor-be included in the delineation of a global climate policy that can be
sustained in the long term.
Another popular economic solution to climate change, specifically a carbon use tax, is similarly problematic because it would be regressive.' 28 By
virtue of this basic inequality, it makes sense to include those who stand to
be disproportionately burdened by the solution to be involved in its application.
Thus, the inclusion of urban voices advanced in this Article would serve
129
the inclusive, participatory goals of the environmental justice movement.
A related, additional benefit of doing this would be to forestall the possibility of increased violence in the poor areas of our mega-cities. As noted earlier, the relationship between violence and increased temperatures is a phenomenon that has received strong support in empirical research on the
subject.13 ° If, along with temperature rise, poor areas also become toxic
hotspots and/or suffer regressive carbon taxes that lead to social protest,
social and economic chaos is likely to follow.
IV. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION
Given the complicated, pluralistic reality of the world's mega-cities, the
challenge is to define the appropriate urban group or groups to participate
in climate change governance. One possible means to do so would be
through a deliberate, measured application of a pluralist model that seeks to
promote participatory, representative democratic governance. The goal
will be to ensure that unheard urban voices are incorporated into climate
change policy and response.
Promisingly, commentators have begun to propose models that would
permit more nuanced responses to climate change governance that would
allow recognition of non-nation state, and even local, actors. Hari Osofsky,
for example, argues "the farther one moves from the strict Westphalian
model" of international law, namely the notion that international order is
based upon consent between "sovereign and equal nation-states," the more
possible it becomes to allow for different conceptions, notions that do not
128. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1586 (noting regressive nature of a carbon tax).
129. LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RA-

CISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 103-21 (2001) (describing

some of the promise and pitfalls of different participatory models in environmental justice
conflicts).
130. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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necessarily "presume[] that the nation-state is impenetrable." 13 ' She and
others have examined "bottom-up lawmaking" for climate change action in
the context of U.S. cities, whereby "[i]n their day-to-day microdecisions,
cities engage with other private and nonprofit actors in an organic lawmak132
ing process whereby practices become norms and norms embed in law."
Judith Resnik and others have argued for according special status to what
they call "translocal organizations of government actors," in order, they
maintain, to break the horizontal and vertical thinking that dominates the
"federalism grid" in thinking about climate change solutions.' 33 Others argue that applying international relations theory to the behavior of cities can
deepen analyses of "cities' motivation and function as attracting capital or
serving as neutral 'markets' or 'bankable' locations" and thus their role in
shaping a response to climate change.1 34 All of this work has a common
dedication to identifying roles for local governments in the shaping of climate change policy. What it lacks, however, is an appreciation that even
local governments may not in fact represent the views of many, if not most
of their inhabitants.
One opportunity to begin to allow a means to give a meaningful voice to
unrepresented urban voices is to structure urban involvement in environmental land management decisions relating to climate change modeled on
the successes of participatory budgeting across the world.
The participatory budget:
[I]s an emanation of the theory of participatory democracy, which maintains that citizens must participate directly in political decisions and not
merely, as representative democracy would have it, in the choice of political decision makers. Itis, therefore, a system of co-governance in which
civil society, far from being a haven of survival before an absent or hostile state, is rather a regular and well-organized way of exerting public

131. Hari M. Osofsky, The Georgraphyof Climate ChangeLitigation PartI: Narratives
of Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHI. J.INT'L L. 573, 578-579 (2008).
132. Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks? Local Climate
Change Coaltions,8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 409, 413 (2008).
133. Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism,
and TranslocalOrganizationsof Government Actors (Togas), 50 ARiz. L. REv. 709 (2008);
see also Parick Parenteau, Lead, Follow, or Get out of the Way: The States Tackle Climate
Change with Little Helpfrom Washington, 40 CoNN. L. REv. 1453 (2008).

134. Katherine Trisolini & Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land Use, and the Global Commons:
Genesis and the UrbanPolitics of Climate Change 16 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Research Paper
No. 08-22, 2008), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-1267314.
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control over 135
the state by means of institutionalized forms of cooperation
and conflict.
Declared by the United Nations to be one of the world's forty best urban
management programs,13 6 the participatory budget first was conducted in
the southern Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in 1989 and has been a staple of
that city's operations ever since. Today it is used throughout cities in Latin
America, Spain, France, Italy, Canada, and in two widely different Indian
states, Kerala and West Bengal. 137 Although the process is a "very dynamic social and political process," making it difficult "to draw from it
many conclusions or projections," the participatory budget "has been a remarkable means of promoting citizen participation in decisions concerning
distributive justice, the effectiveness of decisions, and the accountability"
of elected political leaders.' 38 In other words, participatory budgeting provides an example of democracy emerging from below and not being imposed from above.
in
If one considers the possible application of the participatory budget 139
the context of urban climate change governance along these three axes
alone, it becomes evident that it offers a promising model for a more inclusive form of climate change governance. Before doing so, however, it is
useful to briefly describe the evolution of the participatory budget process
in Porto Alegre, Brazil where the idea become a reality.
A.

The Example of Participatory Budgeting

To understand the implications and possibilities of a participatory climate change governance model based on the participatory budget model, it
is essential to consider the governance traditions against which the idea of
the participatory budget reacted as it was originally developed and implemented in southern Brazil. Two principal features of the prevailing modes
of Brazilian socio-economic and political life can be observed: an authoritarian political tradition and a deeply unequal society both socially and
economically. As de Sousa Santos explains:
Brazil is a society with a long tradition of authoritarian politics. The predominance of an oligarchic, patrimonialist and bureaucratic model of
135. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ParticipatoryBudgeting in Porto Alegre: Toward a
Redistributive Democracy, in DEMOCRATIZING DEMOCRACY, supra note 34, at 307, 307-08
[hereinafter de Sousa, ParticipatoryBudgeting].

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 307.
See id.
Id. at 357.
Namely those cited in the previous paragraph-participation concerning distributive

justice, effective decisions, and political accountability.
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domination has resulted in a state formation, a political system and culture
characterized by the following: political and social marginalization of the
popular classes ...; restriction of the public sphere and its privatization

by the patrimonialist elites; "artificiality" of the democratic game and the
liberal ideology resulting in a huge discrepancy between the "legal country" and the "real country". .. . Brazil is also a society characterized by

outrageous social inequalities, which have in fact increased tremendously
140
in the past 20 years ....
As noted in Part I, these authoritarian and unequal traditions lamentably
dominate life for millions the world over.
The implementation of the participatory budget in Porto Alegre was no
accident. Porto Alegre, Brazil's tenth most-populous city and the capital of
the southernmost Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, was an early site of
success for the Brazilian Worker's Party, which took power in January
1989 with a commitment to "popular administration."' 14 1 In addition,
"[l]ike other Brazilian capitals, in the last decades of the twentieth century
Porto Alegre experienced an accelerated process of urbanization," with its
population doubling between 1960-1980.142 Despite the authoritarian and
unequal characteristics of Brazilian society, Porto Alegre was especially
well positioned for an experiment in participatory politics. Its indices of
educational achievement, along with social indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality, were better than the Brazilian norm.14 3 In addition, "Porto Alegre is a city of ample democratic traditions, a strong, highly
organized civil society" and was a source of resistance during the last military dictatorship, from 1964-1984.144
The newly elected political leadership focused on the budget when
elected to the mayoralty of Porto Alegre, as "[t]he budget is the basic tool
of the political contract underlying ...

relations [between the state and the

citizens] and the interactions of the various state organisms charged with
executing such a contract.' ' 145 Importantly, however, as implemented in
Porto Alegre, "[t]he participatory budget and its institutional framework

140. de Sousa, ParticipatoryBudgeting, supra note 135, at 308 (internal quotations omitDEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, at 282 (2007),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_ENComplete.pdf (indicating
that in Brazil in 2004, the share of income or consumption by the poorest 20% was 2.8%
while the share for the richest 20% was 61.1% and that Brazil's Gini index was fifty-seven);
see also supra note 81 and accompanying text.
141. de Sousa, ParticipatoryBudgeting, supra note 135, at 310.
142. Id.at 311.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.at 312-13.

ted). U.N.
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have no formal legal recognition."' 146 This was because, since 1989, the
Worker's Party has controlled the Mayor's Office, but not the city's Chamber of Deputies. Legally, the Executive (the mayor) is entitled only to
submit the budget to the city legislature, which can be changed or modified
as the legislature sees fit.
In political terms, however, because the executive's [budget] proposal is
sanctioned by the institutions of the participatory budget and thus by the
citizens and community organizations and associations that participate in
them, the executive's proposal becomes afait accompli for the legislative

body in view of the political risks for the147deputies in voting against the
'will of the citizens and the communities.'
In other words, representative democracy bows to the larger, participatory expression of democratic will.
The participatory budget as first implemented in Porto Alegre was based
on three principles: (1) all citizens are entitled to participate as citizens, and
community organizations have no special standing (in other words, no
greater standing than any individual); (2) participation is governed by a
combination of direct and democratic governance rules, and internal rules
of functioning are decided by participants; and (3) investment priorities and
resource allocation follow both "general" and "technical criteria," where
"general criteria" are substantive criteria decided by the participatory instior economic
tutions and "technical criteria" look to questions of technical
148
viability with reference to federal, state or local legal norms.
There are three basic sets of institutions involved in the execution of the
participatory budget. First, there are several municipal institutions, the two
most important of which are the Planning Office and the Office for Coordinating Relations with Communities. These offices manage the debate with
citizens over the participatory budget. 149 Second, community organizations
independent of municipal government, somewhat similar to neighborhood
planning associations in the United States, "mediate between citizen participation and the choice of priorities for city regions."' 50 The third set of
institutions responsible for advancing the participatory budget process are
"designed to establish a permanent mediation and interaction between the
first two kinds. They are regularly functioning institutions of community
participation," notably the Counsel of Participatory Budgeting ("COP" in

146. Id.at 313.
147. Id.

148. Id.
at 314.
149. Id.
at 316.
150. Id.
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its Portuguese acronym). 151 The COP and a Forum of Delegates are then
charged to pursue the "main goal" of the participatory budget, which "is to
encourage a dynamics [sic] and establish a sustained mechanism for joint
management of public resources through shared decisions on the allocation
of budgetary funds and for governmental accountability concerning the effective implementation of such decisions."' 152 A thorough description of
the highly articulated structure through which the Forum of Delegates and
the COP operate is beyond the scope of this Article. In brief, however, it
merits explaining only that both entities subsequently work in the sixteen
different regions into which the city was divided for execution of the
budget. 153 Within those regions-and sometimes in micro-regions within
them, as determined by citizen participants-there are several rounds of
plenary assemblies to consider and identify budgeting priorities.' 54 Since
1994, there have been six thematic areas. 155 For purposes of this paper, the
two most notable such thematic areas are Health and Social Welfare and
City Organization, Urban, and Environmental Development. 56 Moreover,
these plenaries do not occur without extensive citizens' preparatory meetings, the aim of which "is to collect the demands and claims of individual
citizens, grassroots movements, and community institutions, concerning
regional or thematic issues; they also initiate community mobilization to
157
select regional delegates."'
This is not the tidiest of democratic processes, and its structure has
evolved over time. For example, there has been regular modification of
criteria for delegate selection to the regional forums. 158 The important
thing to note is that the changes were made by broad, participatory
choice-to repeat: this is democracy emerging from below, and not imposed from above. In this way, the participatory budget seeks to avoid
some of the "deliberative challenges"-and specifically the hijacking of
popular desires for established interests-that occurs in some efforts to
give voice to grassroots concerns. 159
The aim, ultimately, is to identify the three budget priorities for which
there is consensus. A process of deliberation in the regional councils,

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 319-20.
See, e.g., Cole & Foster, supra note 129, at 115-21.
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which then gets turned back to the COP and other citizen-focused deliberative assemblies, achieves this. There is much back-and-forth throughout
the process between citizens, the executive, and the elected representatives."' Throughout, "the executive plays a decisive role." 16' Finally, the
expressions of public preference are translated into concrete budget items
through a sophisticated system of grading and weighing preferences. This,
162
like so many details of the participatory budget, also changes constantly.
As the above description suggests, participatory budgeting is not a prob163
lem-free panacea. Challenges include control over information flows;
concerns about the autonomy of the COP and other citizen-oriented organs; 164 inadequate representation of women, especially at the higher levels
of budgetary decision making; 165 worries about the entrenchment of the
representatives of the popular assemblies; 166 and tensions in "relations between popular participation and popular representation." 167 A recurrent
challenge concerns the fact that such a participatory democratic model in a
representative system effectively creates "a model of co-government, that
is to say, a model for sharing political power by means of a network of democratic institutions geared to reaching decisions by deliberation, consensus, and compromise."' 168 This can be unwieldy and requires constant
69
oversight and re-thinking. 1
Nonetheless, and despite these ongoing struggles, the process appears to
have become more robust over time. A remarkable feature of the participatory budget as applied in Porto Alegre (and subsequently copied widely) is
that, despite such conflicts and the growing sophistication of the metrics for
measuring popular priorities, not to mention an increasingly complex operational structure, the numbers of people involved in the process grew exponentially.' 70 This appears to have been possible only because it:
seeks to articulate measures of participation, on the one hand, with measures of priority and recognized necessity, on the other. The participation
measure guarantees the democratic legitimacy of political decisions,

160. See de Sousa, ParticipatoryBudgeting,supra note 135, at 320-23.
161. Id.at 322.
162. See, e.g., id. at 324-25.
163. Id.at 321, 345 & 362.
164. Id.at 323.
165. Id.at 337-38.
166. Id.at 338-39.
167. Id. at 339.
168. Id.at 343.
169. Id.at 359-66 (discussing in detail the past problems and future governance challenges with the participatory budget model).
170. Id. at 326-33 (describing this process).
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whilst the priority and necessity measure guarantees the fidelity, objectivof the conversion of political decisions into distribity and transparency
71
resources.
uted
The process appears to have engendered strong fidelity to its achievements. Indeed, although some members of the city legislature have advocated legalizing the participatory budget. This has not occurred because its
participants value the autonomy made possible by the absence of govern72
ment regulation of the process. 1
The participatory principles described above could equally help refine
and sharpen the nature of decisions made through the system of climate
change governance. As mentioned at the outset of this section, three standard goals of the participatory budget process would equally be served if
this model were applied in the context of climate change governance.
B.

Promoting Citizen Participation in Distributive Justice Decisions

This Article has emphasized that much of the world's population is effectively disenfranchised and disconnected from the political and social decision makers who affect their lives. 173 Moreover, as clever critics of climate change resource allocation discussions have noted, the current
justifications for distributive justice in the current climate change governance regime are not compelling.' 74 However, this might not be so if there
were a real possibility for citizens to participate in distributive justice decisions. Were people to understand that decisions were being made that will
affect how they use land and what environmental resources are available to
them, they would likely engage in those decisions and illuminate justifications for resource distribution.
Where we live, and what is available for all of us to stay alive, are of
course questions that affect all of us. These are the kinds of questions that
would be implicated by participatory climate change governance. Thus, it
is likely that many, if not most, people would be animated by the prospect
of engagement in such decisions, just as they have been in Porto Alegre
and elsewhere by the opportunity to participate in resource allocations affecting the quality of their urban lives. Moreover, this opportunity for citizen participation could help clarify some of the imperfect incentives described by commentators like Posner and Sunstein--described above as the

171. Id. at 335.
172. Id. at 356.
173. See supra notes 18-34 and accompanying text. See generally NEUWIRTH, supra note
109.
174. See supra notes 53-75 and accompanying text.
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developed/developing country log-jam of climate change negotiations.
Citizen participation in an inclusive process like that achieved in Porto
Alegre and elsewhere could provide a solution for some of the more intractable climate change policy issues like the appropriate caps for developed
and developing countries. That is, were citizens involved in the process of
making decisions currently performed by their elected or self-appointed
representatives, the results might be surprising. Citizens of a "developed"
country might well, for instance, express a preference for a progressive
carbon tax, or vigorous incentives for behaviors that seek to reduce individual and corporate carbon footprints. 75 Once again, the profusion of local U.S. initiatives seeking to promote aggressive climate change action in
the face of federal inaction suggests this might be true. 176 Similarly, it is
conceivable that the urban poor in a "developing" country might express a
preference for a more restrained growth trajectory if they could first implement a long-term adaptive management strategy to deal with the projected effects of climate change, or even accept the possibility of less income in the short term in return for a gurantee of cleaner air because of,
1 77
say, a limit on the number of coal burning utility plants.
C.

Effectiveness of Decisions

It is equally likely that decisions made with respect to climate change
policy would be more effective if they were the product of participatory as
well as representative decision-making, assuming effectiveness is judged
by the implementation of decisions to change behaviors affecting climate
change. As many climate change analysts have noted, claims for compensation, not to mention pleas for resource redistribution, are, to say the least,

175. John C. Dembach, HarnessingIndividual Behavior to Address Climate Change: Op-

tionsfor Congress, 26 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 107, 123-24 (contending that the focus of any effort
should be to change behavior and that financial and other incentives can be used to encourage certain behaviors, discourage others, or both); Sewell Chan, Bloomberg Callsfor Tax on
Carbon Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, available at http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.
com/2007/11/02/bloomberg-calls-for-tax-on-carbon-emissions/ (noting that the idea of a
carbon tax has been gaining support among not only scholars and environmentalists, but
also business groups and the companies that would be directly affected).
176. See supra note 16.
177. See, e.g., WORLD BANK & STATE ENvTL. PROT. ADMIN., COST OF POLLUTION 1N
CHINA: ECONOMIC ESTIMATES OF PHYSICAL DAMAGES XV (Robert Livemash ed., 2007),
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/
2007/03/30/000090341 _20070330141612/Rendered/PDF/392360CHAOCost1 of] PollutionO
1PUBLICI.pdf (stating the surveys conducted as part of the study suggest that people in
China value improvements in health beyond productivity gains and are willing to pay to attain these improvements).
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controversial, particularly for interests in developed countries.178 The
heaviest carbon emitters, and notably the United States, are reluctant to
agree to cap-and-trade systems or a progressive carbon tax on the grounds
that such mechanisms would be unfairly prejudicial to their interests. 79 A
participatory element in climate change governance could help re-direct
that resistance inasmuch as it would force us to scrutinize with greater
specificity the wide variety of carbon-emitting behaviors (where and by
whom) in both developed and developing countries. Thus, urban participation in climate change governance would uncover a much wider range of
opinion about and desire to find solutions for climate change than is the
by representative governments in
case when the stage is occupied only
1 80
multilateral and bilateral negotiations.'
D.

Participatory Democracy and the Accountability of Elected
Representatives

The participatory budgeting model described for use in climate change
governance does not, as explained above, replace popular will for representative governance.18 1 On the contrary, as the discussion above outlined, it
into representative democracy, producing a
introduces a participatory voice
82
new form of co-governance. 1
The advantages of that model as applied in the budgeting context would
apply equally in the context of climate change. That is, for instance, a participatory role for the residents of cities would likely increase the accountability of governments. For instance, imagine that, as a result of the participatory budget process in a number of U.S. cities, the U.S. Conference
on Mayors announced its preference for a fixed percentage to reduce cli-

178. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensationfor Victims of Climate Change, 155
U. PA. L. REv. 1605, 1607 (2007) (noting the fact that any compensation for climate change
effects is controversial).
179. See, e.g., Christina K. Harper, Climate Change and Tax Policy, 30 B.C. INT'L &
CoMi'. L. REv. 411, 419-20 (2007) (noting one reason the United States rejected the Kyoto
Protocol is due to the belief that mandatory emissions cuts were a serious threat to the U.S.
economy); Stephanie L. Wilson, Dog Days of Climate Change: Heating the Debate for
FederalCap-and-Trade,28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 163, 170 (2008) (noting that a
cap-and-trade policy that mirrored the Kyoto Protocol could cause United States' economic
growth to decline and that some economists do not support this model, arguing that it would
strain the economy).
180. STEWART & WIENER, supra note 3, at 41-42 (reporting "differences in circumstances" among developing countries).
181. See de Sousa, ParticipatoryBudgetary, supra note 135, at 360-64 (explaining that
the tension between representative and participatory democracy is embedded in the participatory budget process).
182. Id. at 343-52.
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mate emissions by some number-X%-by year Y. Were the official U.S.
position on this question to diverge from this stance, surely it would not be
sustainable as a political matter, having been endorsed by a broad spectrum
of social interests. Suppose similarly that representatives of residents of a
group of Indian or Chinese cities were to articulate a comparable position,
stating the desire to reduce health care costs for the treatment of respiratory
illnesses by limiting the construction of coal-fired utility plants. In this circumstance, it seems equally likely that the popular pressure would alter the
official position of the "representative" government.
To be sure, there are many niceties of a participatory model as applied to
climate change governance that remain to be worked out. While it worked
in Porto Alegre, would it work in cities with lower levels of public education and worse human development indicia? How could it be constructed
across cultures and political systems to ensure that the executive power
does not steal the decision making powers of the population? What is clear
is that in climate change governance, a matter that affects the resolution of
one of the greatest social, economic, and environmental threats facing us
today, new thinking about the best means to effect climate change policy is
essential. As James Gustave Speth, the former administrator of the United
Nations Development Program, recently observed:
It is no accident that environmental crisis is gathering as social injustice is
deepening and growing inequality is impairing democratic institutions.
Each is the result of a system of political economy-today's capitalismthat is profoundly committed to profits and growth and profoundly indifferent to nature and society .... The best hope for change in America is
a fusion of those concerned about the environment, 83social justice and
strong democracy into one powerful progressive force.1
Speth might have said that this is the best hope not noly for "America,"
but also for the globe. As this Article has endeavored to show, the nature
and future prospects of the world's mega-cities, without the possibility of a
participatory role for their largely unheard residents, will only negatively
compound the already severe consequences we face because of anthropogenic climate change. Participatory climate change governance provides
one way to create the kind of progressive fusion that we desperately need,
in the United States and beyond its borders.

183. James Gustave Speth, Progressive Fusion, NATION, Oct. 6, 2008, at 28; see also

Lawrence 0. Gostin, Global Health Law Governance, 22 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 35, 37
(2008) (arguing that "[i]f law is to play a constructive role [in improving global health, especially for the poorest nations,] it will require an innovative way of structuring international obligations, and this will in turn require states to accede to a new model").

